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Abstract
European cities are historically characterised by a strong association between social 
cohesion and competitiveness. However, in recent years, this stability has been affected 
by strains induced by rising new inequalities and increasing competition among 
cities. These facts have raised the need for a new understanding of the relationship 
between cohesion and competitiveness. This paper draws on a selection of social and 
economic indicators to explore this multifaceted relationship in 50 European cities, 
selected on the basis of their size and international role. The aims of the analysis are to 
assess the position of each European city, to identify clusters of cities and to suggest an 
interpretative hypothesis in order to characterise the particularities of this relationship 
in European cities.
massively invested by the struggle for compe-
tition have also to cope with greater internal 
inequalities and social polarisation, to the 
point that “disparities within a given city have 
largely surpassed disparities between cities” 
(OECD, 2006, p. 145). Is this also the situa-
tion in the big cities of western Europe? There 
is no doubt that these cities are increasingly 
integrated in the global economy. However, 
differently from other global cities, European 
cities have been historically characterised 
by a strong association between economic 
growth and social cohesion (Preteceille, 
Introduction
In the past two decades, conflicting trends 
have characterised the situation of many 
urban areas across western Europe. The same 
processes driving an increase in the compe-
tition among cities at the global scale have 
played a role in creating tensions in the social 
sphere. It is therefore not only the level of 
competitiveness of cities, but also the impact 
of such competition on the social cohesion of 
cities, that is under scrutiny today.
Globalisation seems to be a relevant factor 
of this situation. As the theory on global cities 
has pointed out (Sassen, 2000), cities that are 
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2000; Haussermann and Haila, 2005). They 
have historically developed a particular 
urban regime to manage inequalities and 
social problems which was founded on a 
compromise between economic interests in 
the city and social responsibility (Le Galès, 
2002). The 1990s constituted a turning-point 
in this regard. If national welfare policies 
underwent a period of retrenchment, the 
growth of globalisation transformed cities 
into new competing ‘actors’ fighting for the 
same resources (Taylor, 2003). While most 
of the European cities drew advantage from 
this new situation promoting a new urban 
growth, they had also to preserve their 
internal social cohesion. Rising inequalities, 
demographic changes brought about by 
ageing and multifaceted immigration, and 
emerging risks of spatial segregation affected 
many urban areas, triggering potential fric-
tions and entailing new political efforts. For 
many European cities, urban success today 
does not depend only on their capacity to 
compete in international markets; it also 
concerns their capacity to guarantee their 
own social reproduction (Ache et al., 2008).
Drawing on diffuse macro-level informa-
tion made available by Eurostat, this article 
aims to examine the following questions. 
Is this particular historical character of 
European cities still preserved? To what extent 
does the struggle for competition among 
cities affect their own social cohesion? What 
aspects of social cohesion are more likely to 
be affected?
Competitiveness and Social 
Cohesion: A Theoretical 
Discussion
The new centrality of the relationship between 
competitiveness and social cohesion has been 
recently stressed by a number of authors 
(Buck et al., 2005; Ache et al., 2008) as well 
as institutional bodies (OECD, 2001, 2006). If 
cities are increasingly recognised as key sites of 
economic opportunity (Florida, 2004), then 
the question becomes not only to what extent 
these changes impact on social cohesion, but 
also what role is played by social cohesion in 
fostering, or limiting, city competitiveness.
In scientific analysis the interplay between 
competitiveness and social cohesion has 
been considered from two different per-
spectives. According to a liberal perspective, 
social cohesion is considered as a functional, 
positively correlated component of urban 
competitiveness. The crucial role now played 
by cities in the global economy would draw 
precisely on their capacity to offer an attrac-
tive social environment for post-industrial, 
non-material economic activities (Begg, 1999; 
Cheshire, 1999; Buck et al., 2005). As stated 
by the OECD
There is considerable evidence that a good 
and attractive environment, including well-
performing urban infrastructure, is not an 
alternative to metropolitan economic success 
but in fact fundamental to its continuation 
(OECD, 2006, p. 137).
Gentrification and greater employment 
opportunities are considered as positive fac-
tors because
by providing a context for social interaction 
and, above all, by supporting larger labour 
markets, cities should be able to nurture an 
environment in which tacit knowledge can 
circulate (OECD, 2006, p. 137).
In this optimistic perspective, competitiveness 
and social cohesion are therefore considered 
to be basically convergent.
Even though this approach captures most 
the peculiarities of post-industrial urban 
economies dealing with increasing interna-
tional competition, it also leaves analytical 
problems still unsolved. First, the concept 
of social cohesion is not adequately defined, 
either theoretically or empirically. It is used 
as a catch-all concept, not clearly linked to 
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the new forms attained by social integration 
in fragmented, multifaceted urban com-
munities. Secondly, the connection between 
competitiveness and social cohesion, whatever 
it means, is regarded as a positive synergy, 
without considering that in post-industrial 
cities tensions and conflicts, much more than 
reciprocity and interdependence, emerge in 
the interplay between these two dimensions.
Research carried out in the UK in the 1990s 
(Buck et al., 2005) found no empirical support 
for this supposed interdependence. Changes 
in the level of economic performance of 
British cities during the 1990s were much bet-
ter explained by traditional economic factors 
(level of deindustrialisation, spatial decon-
centration) than by the level of globalisation 
(Buck et al., 2005). Furthermore, no clear 
correlations between economic competitive-
ness and aspects of social cohesion were found 
(Buck et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, the progressive transition 
of city economies to post-industrialism 
may have partially changed this situation. 
Research more recently carried out on German 
cities (Panebianco, 2008) and Spain (Lopez 
et al., 2008) found a positive correlation 
between social cohesion and competitiveness. 
According to Panebianco, the good impact of 
increasing competitiveness among cities on 
their social cohesion was basically exerted 
via the labour market and it consisted in a 
significant decrease in the unemployment 
rate. In this analysis, however, further crucial 
aspects of social cohesion—such as income 
inequality—were not investigated.
To sum up, research shows that conven-
tional or academic wisdom about the ‘natural’ 
complementarity between competitiveness 
and social cohesion does not have adequate 
empirical support. If this weak interdepend-
ence shows the unrealistic assumptions of 
neo-liberalism, it should be considered as an 
important empirical result in itself. It may be 
hypothesised, indeed, that a lack of necessary 
interdependence between competitiveness 
and social cohesion is the actual condition 
under which the economic growth of cities 
comes about in the global era. Whether or 
not this growth is combined with social cohe-
sion is therefore not a matter of normative 
assumption, but merely one possibility among 
a broad range of options.
A second theoretical perspective has stressed 
the social harm that may be caused by 
increased international competition among 
cities. According to authors like Castells 
(1996) and Sassen (1991, 2000), the rise of 
global financial markets and the introduc-
tion of IC technologies have exposed cities 
to increasing competition with other cities. 
Moreover, the same process brings about 
more social polarisation as a consequence 
of the parallel growth of a low-paid, low-
qualified service industry, attracting masses 
of immigrant workers. The overall effects at 
the city scale are a growing polarisation in the 
earnings and work conditions of the popula-
tion and a greater segmentation of the social 
structure due to the contraction of the urban 
middle class. Therefore, in the global era, 
the economic growth of cities contributes to 
social dualism rather than to the expansion of 
the middle class, as was the case in the three 
decades after the Second World War.
However, there is evidence that greater 
inequality in income affecting most of the 
European cities in the past decade has been 
more beneficial to the upper class than det-
rimental to lower classes. In most European 
countries, the income of the top decile of the 
population has significantly increased, while 
the income level of lower classes has not fun-
damentally changed. For example, Hamnett 
found that
London (like Amsterdam and Paris) has 
been characterised by an increase in the 
number and proportion of highly skilled 
and highly paid professional, managerial and 
technical workers in the service sector but by 
a decline in the number of less-skilled workers 
(Hamnett, 2003, p. 102). 
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Increasing inequality has therefore negatively 
affected the relative position of the traditional 
middle and lower classes with respect to the 
emerging class of affluent professionals and 
managers, but it has not actually increased the 
risk of absolute poverty and social exclusion. 
Concepts such as inequality or social distance, 
in conclusion, seem to describe this situation 
more adequately than the notions of social 
polarisation or dualism.
To sum up, the theory of social polarisation 
in global cities (Sassen, 1991, 2000; Castells, 
1996) has to date received weak empirical 
support in Europe. A large amount of research 
has identified basic differences between 
European and American cities, showing that 
explanatory models that have been convinc-
ingly used to describe social trends in US cities 
are difficult to apply to European cities. It is 
precisely the stability of the urban middle 
class that some scholars (Preteceille, 2000; Le 
Galès, 2002; Oberti, 2007) consider to be the 
most important factor protecting European 
cities against social polarisation. However, 
recent research on London has shown that, as 
a consequence of rising levels of immigration
alongside the growing proport ion of 
professional and managerial jobs in London 
there has also been a small but significant rise 
in the proportion of low-paid jobs (May et al., 
2007, pp. 251–252).
Increased immigration could have contrib-
uted to new forms of social polarisation 
(Wills et al., 2009).
To sum up our discussion, previous research 
shows that, while there is no complementa-
rity between these two aspects, nor is there a 
mechanical opposition between international 
competition and social integration. Both the 
theoretical perspectives considered in this dis-
cussion prove inadequate. The main difficulty 
is that both of them are biased by theoretical 
prejudices claiming to provide a unilateral, but 
at the same time general, interpretation of this 
complicated relationship. Competitiveness 
and social cohesion can be both opposed and 
complementary. It depends on the specific 
conditions under which their relationship 
takes place (Haussermann and Haila, 2005), 
including the role played by national and 
regional welfare arrangements (Mingione, 
2005). And it also depends on time and space. 
European cities exhibit a broad mosaic of 
possible interrelationships which have still to 
be categorised. Finding and describing these 
different configurations is the main purpose 
of the following empirical analysis.
Concepts and Methodology
Competitiveness and social cohesion are very 
broad concepts. Previous analysis has often 
attributed different meanings to these aspects. 
Therefore a brief discussion of their theoreti-
cal and empirical definition is required. The 
general approach here is to consider aspects 
that are clearly related to economic indicators 
in the case of competitiveness, and to social 
indicators in the case of social cohesion. 
The challenge consists exactly in exploring 
the whole range of possible connections, or 
detachments, between these two aspects.
The data analysed were provided by Urban 
Audit1 and the analysis focused on 50 west-
ern European cities selected on the basis of 
the following criteria: cities belonging to the 
EU-15 member-states; cities with more than 
800 000 inhabitants.2
The first aspect to be introduced is global 
competitiveness, by which we mean the 
economic performance achieved by cities 
in relation to the role played in the global 
economy. It is generally accepted that urban 
competitiveness in the global economy should 
be considered as a multidimensional concept 
including various aspects of the economic 
performance of a city (Gordon, 1999; Boddy, 
1999; Camagni, 2002; Turok, 2005; Schwab, 
2009). In this paper, three dimensions of 
global competitiveness will be considered: 
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the general level of productivity of the urban 
economy as it is reflected in standard meas-
ures of economic performance; the capacity 
of the city to attract highly skilled workers 
and advanced trades; the level of internation-
alisation of its economy by considering the 
specialisation in globalised economic func-
tions and the presence of multinational com-
panies in the city. The level of productivity is 
measured through GDP per head weighted 
by purchasing power parity3 and GDP per 
employed. We combined these two measures 
in order to minimise the bias caused by the 
presence of different levels of inequality in the 
income distribution due to different activity 
rates and wage levels in our cities.
Increasing scepticism has spread in the 
scientific and political discussion about the 
efficacy of GDP as an indicator of living 
standards (Stiglitz et al., 2009). However, the 
same critics recommend, as a way of dealing 
with these deficiencies, emphasising well-
established indicators other than GDP in 
statistical accounts. This is precisely what we 
do in this study, by considering more eco-
nomic dimensions: the level of globalisation 
and the accessibility of cities. Globalisation 
is measured by considering the proportion 
of employment in financial intermediation 
and business activities, and a global service 
firms index4 measuring the international net-
working capacity of each city (Taylor, 2003). 
Accessibility is finally considered through 
two indicators: a multimodal accessibility 
index provided by Urban Audit (combining 
together accessibility by air, by rail and by 
road) and the proportion of non-domestic 
flight departures as reported in the same 
database. Finally, we have a multiple index 
including many aspects of the cities’ economic 
performance: productivity, specialisation in 
advanced services delivery, economic inter-
connections at a global scale, accessibility. 
All these aspects are deeply intertwined with 
each other as shown by the highly significant 
correlations (around 0.60).
A second aspect is related to the demographic 
trends characterising cities. This aspect is 
crucial in our analysis for many, though 
controversial, reasons. In economic theory, 
growth in population has long been con-
sidered as a sign of the attractiveness of 
cities, showing their capacity to offer good 
living conditions, work opportunities and 
good chances for the young generations 
to procreate (Glaeser et al., 1995; Glaeser 
and Gottlieb, 2006; Storper and Manville, 
2006). Moreover, population growth is 
considered to have a positive influence on 
the economic conditions of cities, affect-
ing their long-term financial sustainability, 
the size of the working-age population 
and fostering agglomeration economies 
and productivity (Turok and Mykhnenko, 
2007). However, the empirical evidence 
supporting this strong association between 
population growth and economic success 
is not so large (Hansen, 2001). Moreover, 
the economic returns of population growth 
seem to depend on institutional factors, as 
Turok and Mykhnenko (2007) have shown. 
To what extent migration towards large 
cities indicates attractiveness basically 
depends on the integration model of new 
migrants: “the stimulus to cities may be lim-
ited if the migrants are not integrated into 
the labour market” (Turok and Mykhnenko, 
2007, p. 175). Finally, the relationship 
between population growth and economic 
performance is changing over time and 
space. It may be that part of the supposed 
advantages of large cities in favouring infor-
mation mobility and knowledge externalities 
could be reversed in a future characterised by 
increasing diffusion of knowledge and infor-
mation networks via Internet interactions.
To sum up, demographic trends seem to 
play a relevant role in determining the eco-
nomic performance, but social cohesion, as 
well as inclusion policy, could play a crucial 
role in favouring, or impeding, this positive 
association.
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Data on both the demographic trends 
and the population structure will be used 
to characterise the demographic situation 
of cities. We will consider first population 
change 1991–2001 to characterise the main 
demographic patterns of cities in the 1990s. 
According to recent demographical analy-
sis (Bosker and Marlet, 2006), differentials 
in urban growth among European cities 
depend more on their birth rate (or fertility 
rate) than on migration flows. Therefore, we 
will consider the general fertility rate (which 
measures the number of births per 1000 
women aged 20–54) for each city to catch 
the propensity of the population to natural 
reproduction. Finally, one of the main chal-
lenges of European cities comes from the 
ageing of the population and the consequent 
increasing financial and care burden taken by 
the active population (Scharf and Phillipson, 
2009). Increase in the old age dependency rate 
(measured as the ratio between the popula-
tion aged >65 years and the population aged 
between 15 and 65 years) is caused not only by 
increase in the life expectancy of the popula-
tion, but also by the demographic trends of 
the overall population: indeed, cities showing 
the highest growth in population have the 
lowest dependency rate.
The final demographic trends index is the 
mean of the standardised values of these 
three indicators (correlations among them 
are around 0.40). It describes the demo-
graphic situation of cities, jointly considering 
dynamic and structural aspects.
The third aspect to be considered is social 
cohesion. This is a fuzzy concept, includ-
ing heterogeneous dimensions such as 
social integration, solidarity, inequality, 
place attachment or identity. Many dif-
ferent definitions have been proposed in 
order to reduce its vagueness (Jenson, 
1998; Lockwood, 1999; Berger-Schmitt, 
2000; Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Chan and 
Chan, 2006; Hulse and Stone, 2007). The 
theoretical background of such definitions 
is represented by Durkheim’s notions of 
social integration and solidarity. While most 
classifications try to cover the whole range 
of possible meanings attached to Durkheim’s 
original concepts (Buck, 2005), there have 
been recent attempts to assume a more inter-
pretative approach. Starting from here, two 
different perspectives have been developed. 
On the one hand, aspects that are inherent 
to mutual trust among citizens, or a sense 
of belonging to or membership of specific 
communities or social groups, have been 
stressed (Chan and Chan, 2006). The basic 
argument behind this approach is to distin-
guish clearly the means and ends of social 
cohesion in order to concentrate attention 
on the cultural orientations that seem to be 
intrinsic to the Durkheimian original con-
cept of social cohesiveness.
On the other hand, attention has been 
focused on group divisions, cleavages or 
social inequalities limiting the access of 
citizens to equal opportunities and therefore 
reducing social inclusiveness (Dahrendorf, 
1995). Here, the stress is on the emergence 
of new economic, ethnic or gender disparities 
and on urban fragmentation weakening the 
structural foundations of social integration 
in contemporary societies (Crouch, 1999; 
Taylor-Gooby, 2004). This second perspec-
tive has also been adopted by the European 
Commission, which puts social cohesion 
forward as one of the main ingredients 
of the so-called European social model 
(European Committee for Social Cohesion, 
2004; European Commission, 2006).
These two perspectives are actually not 
as different as they pretend to be. The eco-
nomic growth of European cities has been 
historically characterised by the correspond-
ing development of social citizenship as the 
basis for collective solidarity and institutional 
responsibility. The values of solidarity and 
mutual trust have therefore been established 
through the development of citizenship as 
a social status inextricably connected with 
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rights and duties that are institutionally 
guaranteed, and on the capacity of pub-
lic institutions to provide citizens with 
equal opportunities and social inclusiveness. 
Therefore, a clear-cut distinction between the 
means and ends of social cohesion is difficult 
to find in this context: equal opportunity and 
inclusiveness do not constitute means for 
social cohesion, but are fundamental elements 
of a collective solidarity as a shared identity 
connecting citizens and not just individuals. 
They provide the institutional and social 
grounds on which solidarity and the collective 
identity of European cities have been histori-
cally developed.
Looking at the social and institutional 
mechanisms contributing to cities’ social 
cohesion, it emerges that equal opportuni-
ties and inclusiveness constitute the two 
basic elements on which citizenship, as a 
social and institutional practice, is grounded 
and has developed in contemporary western 
European cities.
In this perspective, two main dimensions 
of social cohesion will be taken into account. 
The first aspect is equality. Obstacles to an 
even distribution of opportunities in cities 
will be investigated by considering gender 
discrimination, inequity in the level of educa-
tion and territorial disparity. Three measures 
of disparity will be used: a ‘Gini’ index con-
sidering the distribution of different levels of 
education in the population, the gender gap 
in the activity rate, the gap in the unemploy-
ment rate between the core and larger urban 
zone of the cities.5 A condensed index (mean 
value of standardised values) combines all 
these aspects and therefore includes multiple 
forms of equity.
The second aspect is inclusiveness. In 
western European cities, the labour market is 
clearly the main channel for social inclusion, 
although not the only one. Although widely 
used to measure urban competitiveness, 
the general level of employment in a city 
more properly points to the social impact of 
economic growth, which does not necessarily 
translate into labour extension. Indeed, cities 
differ greatly not only in the general amount 
of jobs available to the population, but also 
in their capacity to reduce explicit or implicit 
unemployment. Explicit unemployment is 
shown by the unemployment rate. Implicit 
unemployment is shown by the level of inac-
tivity among the working-age population and 
it is generally related to women. A complex 
index of inclusiveness is therefore created 
calculating the mean of two standardised 
variables: the female activity rate and the 
general unemployment rate. As expected, 
there is a high correlation (-0.68) between 
these two variables.
The Economic Performances of 
the Cities
Global competitiveness reaches very different 
levels in EU cities (see Figure 1). Four cities 
stand out for having a very high perform-
ance: Brussels, Paris, London and Frankfurt. 
Following these are two continental cities, 
Milan and Munich, and three northern cities, 
Amsterdam, Copenhagen and Stockholm. 
Other continental and Nordic cities (not 
included in the figure) score closely to these 
cities, among which there are the three 
North Sea cities of Hamburg, Antwerp and 
Rotterdam, and the continental cities of Kohn 
and Wien. A larger group of south European, 
Anglo-Saxon and French cities are just below 
the average level, among which there are 
capital cities such as Berlin, Madrid and 
Rome as well as big non-capital cities with a 
relevant national and international economic 
role such as Manchester, Barcelona and Lyon. 
Finally, a much larger group of cities has a 
lower level of competitiveness; these cities are 
mostly located in southern Europe (Valencia, 
Oporto, Turin, Naples, Athens), in the 
ex-industrial areas of the UK (Birmingham, 
Liverpool) and in the former East Germany 
(Leipzig and Dresden).
2796  COSTANZO RANCI
The global competitiveness index shown in 
Figure 1 includes many dimensions and cit-
ies rank differently according to the various 
dimensions considered. While productivity 
is higher in Brussels, Paris and some Nordic 
cities, only three cities stand out for their level 
of global connectivity: London, Milan and 
Frankfurt. Accessibility is higher in London 
and Brussels. These differences show therefore 
that competitiveness takes different shapes 
through Europe. London stands out thanks 
to its strong interconnection at the global 
level, even though productivity is not high. 
Brussels and Paris show very high levels in 
productivity and accessibility, mainly due to 
their international status and, in the case of 
Brussels, to the EU political and administra-
tive functions that are located in the city. 
Milan and Frankfurt excel thanks to their high 
level of international interconnectivity driven 
by the high concentration of financial services 
in these cities. Finally, the Nordic cities show 
a high performance in productivity, but not 
in globalisation and accessibility. It seems 
therefore that different paths of economic 
developments characterise European cities.
Competitiveness and Demographic 
Trends
Data from Urban Audit enabled us to identify 
configurations between competitiveness and 
demographic growth that were distinctive 
of European cities. As shown by Figure 2, 
competitiveness and demographic trends 
are weakly correlated (r = 0.34). All the com-
ponents included in our demographic trend 
index are not significantly associated with the 
global competitiveness index of EU cities. The 
only exception is the association between pro-
ductivity and population change (r = 0.47), 
which shows that, in the 1990s, population 
growth was higher in the best-performing 
cities. Furthermore, city size does not affect 
this substantial statistical independence.
Nevertheless, the absence of strong statisti-
cal causal links between these two variables 
does not mean that economic growth and 
population growth are unconnected in spe-
cific urban contexts. Indeed, we can identify 
four groups of cities in which the relationship 
between competitiveness and demographic 
trends is marked.
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Figure 1.  Global competitiveness index: ranking of 17 western European cities. 
Source: Eurostat Urban Audit, 2001.
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There are cities where an adequate level 
of global competitiveness is associated with 
growth in population and high fertility rates 
(see Figure 2). This synergy is particularly 
strong in Scandinavian, Benelux and French 
cities, as well as in London. In these cities, the 
availability of maternal benefits and child-
care services, as well as good employment 
opportunities and generous housing policies 
towards the young, have contributed to raise 
fertility rates and attract youngsters.
Demographic stability with high economic 
competitiveness characterises most of the 
German cities. In these cities, it is a very low 
fertility rate that particularly contributes to 
the inertia of the demographic trend, as well 
as the ageing of the population.
A third situation is characteristic of com-
petitive cities (like Milan and Barcelona) with 
particularly critical demographic situations. 
In these areas, demography has become a 
serious social problem contrasting with good 
levels of global competitiveness. It concerns 
the capacity of these cities to sustain social 
reproduction, reversing the outflow from 
the city of youngsters and satisfying the 
demand for liveability expressed by the local 
population.
Finally, there are some cities in southern 
Europe and ex-industrial British areas where 
positive demographic trends contrast with very 
low economic performance, paving the way 
for more unemployment and social tensions.
To sum up, as expected, we did not find a 
close association between competitiveness 
and demographic trends in European cities. 
This result is consistent with empirical evi-
dence about American cities (Hansen, 2001) 
and contrasts with economic theories assum-
ing that high immigration and birth rates 
are predictive of a good economic growth of 
cities (Glaeser et al., 1995). This independ-
ence can be explained by two main factors: 
first, the translation of demographic growth 
into economic success crucially depends on 
the social inclusion capacity of cities (Turok 
and Mykhnenko, 2007); secondly, strong 
economic performance does not necessarily 
Figure 2.  Demographic trend index and global competitiveness index. 
Source: Eurostat Urban Audit, 2001.
2798  COSTANZO RANCI
bring about more opportunities in the labour 
market. Much depends on social and institu-
tional conditions, including the capacity to 
support the reconciliation of work and child-
care, the provision of affordable housing for 
immigrants and the general inclusivity of the 
local labour market (Kazepov, 2005). As such 
conditions are differently distributed through 
European cities (Mingione, 2005), then it is 
not surprising that we found strong dissimi-
larities among cities in the way competitive-
ness and demography are linked together.
Competitiveness and Inequality
In this section, we focus on the association 
between competitiveness and social inequality.
Our data enabled us to consider inequality only 
in education, gender and territory. Inequality 
in education can be considered to some extent 
as a good proxy for income disparities.
The results shown in Figure 3 do not 
provide empirical support for the idea of a 
negative association between competitiveness 
and inequality in western European cities. 
European cities exhibit levels of inequality 
that are largely independent from their levels 
of global competitiveness (the correlation 
index is not significant at the 0.05 level). In 
the absence of comparison with cities of other 
continents, it is difficult to assess the extent 
to which this finding is peculiar to European 
cities. My interpretation is that, in western 
Europe, certain levels of equity are still a 
social guarantee not significantly affected by 
economic performances. Cities with higher 
levels of competitiveness do not exhibit higher 
levels of inequality than cities with lower 
Figure 3.  Inequality index and global competitiveness index. 
Note: Equality index >0 means that inequality is higher than the average level. 
Source: Eurostat Urban Audit, 2001.
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performance; nor are the most globalised 
cities significantly more unequal than others.
If global competitiveness does not sig-
nificantly affect the level of inequality in 
western European cities, it may be that 
geographical and institutional factors play 
a more substantive role. Most of the cities 
showing the highest levels in inequality 
are indeed located in areas of southern 
Europe where economic depression and 
underdevelopment are still dominant. 
Furthermore, inequality characterises a 
group of ex-industrial cities in the UK and 
in central-northern Europe. On the opposite 
side, high levels in equity are characteristic 
of Scandinavian and former East German 
cities. French cities come close to the former, 
while German-speaking cities are situated in 
an intermediate position.
How can we explain these results? Equity 
in western Europe has long been guaranteed 
by the widespread and generous intervention 
of the state. Welfare programmes and high 
levels of housing and labour market regula-
tion have greatly contributed to preserve 
equity and social cohesion in most of the 
European cities, including ex-socialist urban 
areas. The responsibility of local authorities 
to protect the most disadvantaged part of 
population has been only complementary to 
a wider intervention by the state in redistrib-
uting benefits and resources. This situation 
has not basically changed in the past decade, 
notwithstanding cuts in welfare expenditures 
(Pierson, 2001; Starke, 2006; Ferrera, 2008) 
and state rescaling strategies aimed at dis-
mantling the redistributive action of welfare 
institutions (Brenner, 2004; Garcia, 2006). 
It could be, therefore, that the national state 
scale is more appropriate to an understanding 
of urban equity than the urban scale itself. 
If European cities are not so much harmed 
by globalisation as other global cities in the 
world, this is due to the wide redistribu-
tion performed by their own nation-states 
(Kazepov, 2005).
However, the extension and intensity of 
state intervention are very varied through 
western Europe. It should be expected, there-
fore, that the level of inequality in the cities 
much depends on the type of welfare regimes 
adopted by the nation-states. This is actually 
the case, as Figure 4 shows. Cities belonging 
to the Mediterranean welfare regime have the 
highest score in the inequality index, followed 
by cities located in the Anglo-Saxon welfare 
regime. In these two welfare regimes, not 
only do cities have a higher score, but also 
they show more variation. Scandinavian and 
continental cities are finally the most equal 
situations, with a lower degree of variations.6
Competitiveness and Inclusiveness
According to Gordon, the basic component 
of competitiveness affecting social cohesion 
is the demand for labour
The most obvious way in which competitiveness 
might be expected to affect cohesion would 
be through the impact of a stronger demand 
for labour on employment among marginal 
groups and hence on poverty, via reduced 
levels of unemployment and involuntary 
inactivity (Gordon, 2005, p. 84).
Our empirical evidence shows that this asso-
ciation is rather complex to describe. Looking 
at correlations, it seems that productivity is 
positively associated with the level of employ-
ment (r = 0.37), contributing also to decrease 
implicit unemployment (the correlation with 
the female activity rate is r = 0.44). This result 
is consistent with economic theory that points 
out the positive correlation between firms’ 
agglomeration in big cities and the extension 
of employment opportunities for workers 
(Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1995, 1996; Jensen-
Butler, 1999).
While higher inclusiveness is associated 
with productivity, the same does not hold 
for globalisation (r = 0.07) and attractiveness 
(r = 0.19). This fact raises questions about the 
2800  COSTANZO RANCI
social impact of the increasing internationali-
sation of the economies of European cities. 
Women and young people living in these 
global cities seem to have no better chances 
of employment than people living in more 
locally based or nationally based cities.
There is sense in this result. As Gordon 
(1999) has already shown, internationalisa-
tion does not automatically bring radical 
changes in the economic arrangement of cit-
ies, including the organisation of the labour 
market. The most significant advantages of 
globalising urban competition are likely to 
be taken by highly competitive international 
specialist centres, while local economic activi-
ties are not significantly affected.
This analysis supports the view that pro-
ductivity, rather than globalisation, contrib-
utes to the general expansion of the labour 
market. Nevertheless, the consequences of 
this process are variable and they are a matter 
of controversy. According to some scholars, 
increased employment goes together with 
the deskilling of workers, because it mainly 
takes place in low-skilled and underpaid 
services highly attractive to immigrants, 
the outcome being the progressive polarisa-
tion of urban societies (Sassen, 1991, 2000; 
Wacquant, 2007). According to others, new 
employment opportunities are mainly to 
the benefit of those who occupy higher and 
already-privileged positions in the social 
scale, without substantially altering the 
work conditions and well-being of lower 
social groups (Brint, 1991; Preteceille, 2000; 
Burgers and Musterd, 2002; Hamnett, 2003). 
In the end, the crucial question is: who in a 
city does benefit from the increased employ-
ment opportunities that are brought by a 
high level of productivity?
Our data provide a partial answer to such 
a question. A significant positive correlation 
between competitiveness and educational 
equality has emerged (r = 0.41). The more 
cities are competitive, the more the gap 
between high and low levels of education 
diminishes. This holds especially true for 
continental cities, while in Scandinavian and 
Figure 4.  Range of variation in the inequality index of European cities, according to the 
welfare regime (means per welfare regime). 
Source: Eurostat Urban Audit, 2001
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East German cities education equity is very 
high due to the traditional strong investment 
of the state in these policies. Conversely, 
southern European cities, no matter what 
their competitiveness, show a high level of 
inequality in education.
Higher global competitiveness correlates 
with more equity and a higher general level 
of education in the population, and not 
with polarisation.7 It seems therefore that 
high productivity levels, inclusiveness of the 
labour market, prevalence of a highly skilled 
and well-educated population, and less ine-
quality in education, reciprocally interweave 
to create a favourable urban environment for 
the social inclusion of both talented workers 
and workers at risk of exclusion. This actu-
ally happens, however, only in some of the 
western European cities here considered, 
where public investments in education and 
social welfare are very high. In many cities 
the struggle for global competition does not 
open up great job opportunities, nor does it 
favour an increase in the education level of 
the population.
Conclusion
This analysis has shown that, in western 
Europe, the relationship among social cohe-
sion and global competitiveness is very com-
posite and differentiated by city. Data show 
the absence of a statistical correlation between 
these two dimensions, which gives support 
to the hypothesis that there are specifically 
European patterns of economic development 
and internationalisation. An increase in the 
level of global competitiveness of cities does 
not necessarily increase their level of inequal-
ity or inclusiveness. These two variables 
operate independently, giving rise to several 
possible combinations.
These findings support the hypothesis that, 
in western Europe, the question of social 
equity is relatively separate from the positive 
or negative dynamics of competitiveness and 
economic growth. As discussed in the paper, 
it is mainly the solid tradition of national 
welfare systems, together with the specificity 
of the social structure of European cities, 
which still today anchors the population 
to a basis of social rights able to mitigate 
inequalities. Therefore, many of the remark-
able differences in the social cohesion of 
cities are due to national rather than local 
features. State intervention in social welfare 
still makes a difference in the context of the 
well-protected, affluent countries of western 
Europe (Letho, 2000; Haussermann and 
Haila, 2005).
As a consequence of this disconnection 
between competitiveness and social cohesion, 
European cities do not run a high risk of 
inequality. Nevertheless, this fact also means 
that high levels in global competitiveness do 
not mechanically have positive impacts on 
the social conditions of the European urban 
population. If globalisation is today one of 
the basic components of urban competition, 
high international connectivity does not guar-
antee that economic returns and additional 
opportunities will be taken by large parts of 
the urban population.
These results suggest that further close 
examination is required of this complex, 
and increasingly crucial, potential inter-
dependence. The mechanisms by which 
competitiveness and social cohesion are 
actually connected, or disconnected, should 
be investigated in different cities, by focus-
ing on the areas of possible co-ordination 
or trade-offs between them. The role of the 
welfare state is still crucial in determining 
the conditions under which globalisation 
and productivity can actually improve, not 
hurt, social cohesion. Increasing reduction 
in state intervention and the rise of rescaling 
strategies can threaten the social cohesion 
of western European cities. This analysis has 
shown that the future of social cohesion in 
these cities is not fully in their own hands, 
as it has been for long time so far.
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Notes
1. The Urban Audit database contains data for 
over 250 indicators across different domains 
for urban areas in all the member-states of 
the European Union. Data used in my analysis 
refer to 2001 as the data for 2004 are not yet 
fully available.
2. The only exception is a small group of Italian 
and British cities (between 600 000 and 
800 000 inhabitants) that were included in 
order to balance the sample for these two 
countries.
3. The purchasing power parity (PPP) coefficient 
provides a common currency that eliminates 
the differences in price levels between 
countries.
4. This indicator (office distribution of global 
service firms) is provided by the GaWC 
database (see: www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc).
5. The larger urban zone (LUZ) is a spatial level 
of data aggregation within the Urban Audit 
database which is defined as an approximation 
of the extended functional urban area.
6. The typology of  welfare regimes here 
considered is obtained by splitting the original 
continental regime that was identified by 
Esping-Andersen (1990) in three distinct 
categories.
7. There is no surprise in this result. In cities 
with a low level of illiteracy or poor education, 
such as European cities, any increase in the 
population that is able to graduate entails a 
reduction in the amount of population having 
a very low level of education. The overall 
impact is a better balance in the education 
level of the population.
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